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Family Responsibilities Discrimination in the
Public Sector: Maximizing the Use of Section
1983 to Enforce Constitutional Rights
by STEPHANIE DOMINGUEZ*

Introduction
Chin Kuo's employer demoted him after he took time off to care for
his newborn son.' Lisa Bailey's employer told her that she could not return
to work after maternity leave and she was no longer dependable now that
she had to care for a child. Maxine Hansen's supervisor denied her leave
to take care of her terminally ill husband, complained that her husband's
medication was causing the employer's health insurance premiums to
increase, and told her that her sick husband would be "better off dead." 3
Tara Gorski's supervisors forced her to resign after they made derogatory
comments about her pregnancy, denied her request to transfer to another
work unit, and said, "No one is going to want you because you are
pregnant." 4

Each of these individuals relied on a common type of claim-family
responsibilities discrimination ("FRD")-that not only "has been
increasing at a rate far faster than other types of employment claims,"' but

* J.D. Candidate 2016, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
I am
immensely grateful for the support and assistance of Liz Morris, Deputy Director of the Center
for WorkLife Law and an Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law at the University of California,
Hastings College of the Law.
1. Kuo v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, No. 05-cv-3295 (DRH)(J), 2007 WL 2874845, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2007).
2. Bailey v. Scott-Gallaher, Inc., 480 S.E.2d 502, 503 (Va. 1997).
3. Hansen v. McLeod USA Publ'g Co., No. 03-4087-KES, 2006 WL 978705, at *1
(D.S.D. Apr. 12, 2006).
4. Gorski v. N.H. Dep't of Corrs., 290 F.3d 466, 469 n.1 (1st Cir. 2002).
5. CYNTHIA THOMAS CALVERT, JOAN C. WILLIAMS & GARY PHELAN, FAMILY
RESPONSIBILITIES DISCRIMINATION 11 (2014); accord Kathleen L. Bogas & Charlotte Croson,
Family Responsibilities Discrimination, 88-JAN MICH. B.J. 18, 18 (2009) ("FRD claims
increased nearly 400 percent between 1996 and 2005."); accord Cynthia Thomas Calvert, Family

[315]

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

316

[Vol. 44:3

also "prevail[s] in almost half of the cases, far more frequently than in
other types of employment cases." 6
State and local government employees who face FRD can use
employment statutes, such as 42 U.S.C. section 1983 ("Section 1983"), to
enforce their constitutional due process and equal protection rights.
However, very few employees have relied on the Equal Protection Clause
and even fewer have relied on the Due Process Clause. Given that Section
1983 allows recovery of unlimited compensatory damages, provides a
relatively long statute of limitations, and does not require the plaintiff to
first exhaust administrative remedies, it is a powerful tool to deter FRD in
the workplace.
Part I of this Note defines FRD, highlights its importance, addresses
the various types of claims it creates and employees it affects, and explores
the biases or stereotypes that trigger it. Part II examines two statutes that
state and local government employees can use to prosecute FRD cases:
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") and Section 1983.
Specifically, Part II analyzes the interplay between Title VII and Section
1983 and how state and local government employees can use Section 1983
to enforce their Fourteenth Amendment-Due Process Clause and Equal
Protection Clause-rights when their employers discriminate against them
on the job based on their status as family caregivers. Furthermore, by
drawing on employment cases in caregiver and non-caregiver contexts, this
Note develops novel legal theories plaintiffs can use to bring FRD claims
under these constitutional provisions. Part III argues that a plaintiff facing
FRD should pursue both Title VII and Section 1983 claims when they are
available because of the overlapping legal standards and remedies under
both claims. Finally, Part IV addresses how an FRD plaintiff can frame an
optimal Section 1983 claim-one that implicates Title VII, the Equal
Protection Clause, and all of the procedural and substantive protections
under the Due Process Clause.

What Is Family Responsibilities Discrimination and What
Are Its Implications?

I.

FRD is workplace discrimination based on an employee's actual or
perceived responsibility to care for a family member, including pregnancy
discrimination.7 Although some states and local jurisdictions have passed
Responsibilities Discrimination:Litigation Update 2010, The Center for WorkLife Law (2010),
http://www.worklifelaw.org/pubs/frdupdate.pdf.
6. Calvert, supra note 5, at 2.
7.

See

About

FRD, WORKLIFELAW,

U.C.

http://worklifelaw.org/frd/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2017).
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legislation that specifically prohibits FRD in the workplace, no federal
statute expressly prohibits FRD.8 Accordingly, as discussed below, "most
FRD cases are brought using a patchwork of claims under federal and state
antidiscrimination and leave laws." 9
FRD affects pregnant women, mothers and fathers with young and/or
disabled children, and employees with aging parents or sick spouses or
partners.10 Although most FRD plaintiffs are female, the percentage of
male plaintiffs has increased." Furthermore, employees with FRD claims
can be found in all occupations, including lawyers and business
executives. 12
An employer triggers an FRD claim by taking an adverse employment
action against an employee because of either the employee's actual
caregiving responsibilities or the "employer's assumptions about the
employee's caregiving responsibilities based on gender or other
stereotypes."' 3 Such discrimination can be blatant or subtle.1 4 For
example, a supervisor may blatantly discriminate against a father by
terminating him or openly harassing him for taking time off for childcare.
On the other hand, a supervisor may subtly discriminate against a mother
by denying her a promotion because the supervisor assumes that she would
want to or should spend more time at home with her children.
The bias underlying such blatant or subtle discrimination can be
descriptive or prescriptive." Descriptive bias describes how an individual
is presumed to behave. Some examples of descriptive bias include
assumptions that family caregivers will be less dependable, not return from
maternity leave, be less committed to their jobs, work less hard than other
workers, be less competent, be repulsive to customers, be absent too much,
not work as many hours or as much overtime, be less productive, take long
leaves or even leave the workforce, or be too emotional.1 6 Descriptive bias
about fatherhood, in particular, leads employers to devalue fathers for
becoming "too" active in family life. For example, employers may view
8.

CALVERT, WILLIAMS & PHELAN, supra note 5, at 10.

9. Id.
10. Family Responsibilities Discrimination Fact Sheet, WORKLIFE LAW, U.C. HASTINGS
COLLEGE OF THE LAW, http://worklifelaw.org/pubs/FRDFactSheet.pdf (last visited Jan. 4,
2017).
11. CALVERT, WILLIAMS & PHELAN, supra note 5, at 7 (indicating that eighty-eight percent
of FRD plaintiffs are female).
12. Id.
13. Bogas & Croson, supra note 5, at 19 (emphasis added).
14.

CALVERT, WILLIAMS & PHELAN, supra note 5, at 4.

15.
16.

Id. at 18.
Id. at 18, 22-23, 27.
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fathers who spend too much time with family as being unreliable, doing
"women's work," lacking ambition, or may characterize them as
inappropriately feminine, not team players, or not committed to their jobs. 17
Prescriptive bias, on the other hand, prescribes how an individual
should behave and can be well intentioned-that is, an employer believes
that he or she is acting in the employee's best interests by acting on
gendered assumptions-or hostile. 18 Examples of prescriptive bias include
assumptions that mothers or fathers should stay home with their children,
should work no more than part-time, would not want to travel, and would
not want to relocate their families.' 9
FRD plaintiffs can bring claims under different federal employment
statutes-including Title VII, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978,
the Family Medical Leave Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the
Equal Pay Act of 1963, and the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act-and state antidiscrimination statutes, such as California's Fair
Employment and Housing Act and the Pennsylvania Human Rights Act.20
FRD plaintiffs can also rely on state leave laws-such as California's
Family Rights Act and the District of Columbia Famify and Medical Leave
Act-and common-law causes of action, such as wrongful discharge and
breach of contract. 2 1
FRD claims include any of the following situations:
[F]ailure to hire, failure to promote, demotion, transfer,
reduction or denial of benefits, disparate treatment,
disparate impact, denial of or interference with Family
Medical Leave Act (FMLA) rights, retaliation for
exercising FMLA rights, harassment or hostile work
environment, retaliation, termination, interference with
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
rights, breach of contract, infliction of emotional distress,
and breach of a good faith and fair dealing clause, among
others.22
For example, a mother whose employer did not promote her "because
she has young children may sue for sex discrimination under the federal
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 25-26.
Id. at 18, 23; Bogas & Croson, supra note 5, at 19.
CALVERT, WILLIAMS & PHELAN, supra note 5, at 23.
Id. at 10, 346.

21.
22.

Id. at 346-47, 351.
Id. at 8-9.
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Title VII and her state's counterpart." 2 3 A man whose employer terminated
him "for taking time off to care for his sick wife may sue under the federal
FMLA and his state's counterpart. Either of them may also include
common law claims such as wrongful discharge, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, defamation, and breach of contract." 24
The documented increase in FRD cases is significant, indicating that
employers still do not understand the legal risks presented by FRD.25 The
number of caregiver lawsuits filed between 1989 and 1998 (444 cases) and
between 1999 and 2008 (2,207 cases) has increased by about 400%.26 At
the same time, the number of employment discrimination cases in general
has decreased.27
Workforce demographics provide several possible explanations for
this increase in caregiver lawsuits and indicate that these types of lawsuits
may continue to rise at an increasing rate. 2 8 In fact, "[w]omen make up
about half of the workforce," and a majority, seventy-five percent, of
married mothers with school-age children are employed.29 In the past
couple of decades, fathers have been more actively involved in childcare; 30
"one factor contributing to this trend is the high percentage ([seventy]
percent) of two-parent families in which both parents participate in the paid
workforce."3 1 Only twenty percent of families are "traditional"-with one
breadwinner and one stay-at-home spouse who provides family care. Most
families consist of dual-career couples or single, employed parents. 32
Furthermore, with longer lifespans and shorter hospital stays, the need to
care for adult family members has increased dramatically: About one in
four Americans care for an elder family member. 3 3
FRD plaintiffs prevail in nearly fifty percent of cases, far more often
than in other types of employment cases. 3 4 Furthermore, verdicts and

23. Id. at 10.
24. Calvert, supra note 5, at 10.
25. Id. at 3.
26. Id. at 2, 9.
27. Id. at 2.
28. CALVERT, WILLIAMS & PHELAN, supranote 5, at 12.
29. Id.
30. Id.; Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why Women Still Can't Have It All, THE ATLANTIC
(July/Aug. 2012), www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/07/why-women-still-cant-haveit-all/309020/.
31. CALVERT, WILLIAMS & PHELAN, supra note 5, at 12.
32. Id.
33. Id
34. Calvert, supra note 5, at 2.
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settlements in FRD cases average over $500,000.35 Specifically, 58% are
between $1 and $99,999; 34% are between $100,000 and $999,000; 7% are
between $1,000,000 and $9,999,999; and 1% of the cases are over $10
- * 36
million.
These statistics confirm two things. First, employers need training
and prevention mechanisms in place to eliminate biases against employees
with family caregiving responsibilities.37 Second-and the focus of this
Note-practitioners and employees need to know how to maximize FRD
claims in order to deter FRD in the workplace.

II. Legal Bases of FRD Claims for State and Local Government
Employees
Although plaintiffs bringing FRD claims may rely on a variety of
statutes, this Note analyzes two federal statutes on which local and state
government employees can rely to prosecute FRD claims: Title VII and
Section 1983. The primary focus of this Note is Section 1983, and this
Note analyzes Title VII for two reasons. First, as discussed below, the
legal standard that applies to adjudicating a Title VII claim overlaps with
Second, as will be discussed in Part III, the
that of Section 1983.
overlapping legal standards and remedies under Title VII and Section 1983
indicate that a plaintiff facing FRD should pursue both claims when they
are available.
A.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

Attorneys have relied on Title VII's prohibition on sex discrimination
One factor
more than any other statute to bring FRD lawsuits. 3 8
contributing to this heavy reliance on Title VII is that "the stereotypes that
underlie much of FRD are largely based on gender, such as that caregiving
39
is women's work and men should be breadwinners."
Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on "race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin,"4 0 and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act

35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 2-3.

38. CALVERT, WILLIAMS & PHELAN, supra note 5, at 49; Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal,
Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relieffor Family Caregivers Who Are DiscriminatedAgainst on the
Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 77, 123 (2003).
39.

CALVERT, WILLIAMS & PHELAN, supra note 5, at 43.

40.

42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-2(a)

(2016).
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of 1978 added a prohibition against pregnancy discrimination.41 Title VII
"applies to all aspects of the employment relationship, including hiring,
compensation, training, benefits, working conditions, discipline,
promotion, and termination." 42 Additionally, it covers all local and state
employers with at least fifteen employees.4 3 FRD plaintiffs rely on Title
VII's prohibition on sex discrimination to bring two types of FRD claims:
disparate treatment and disparate impact.
1.

DisparateTreatment

An applicant or employee can bring a disparate treatment claim under
Title VII by proving that the employer intentionally treated the applicant or
employee less favorably based on sex. 44 Intent arises when the employer
treats an applicant or employee differently because of his or her sex,
without regard to the employer's subjective mental state.45 Plaintiffs can
prove intent by using three types of evidence: mixed motive, direct, or
indirect.
In a mixed motive case, a plaintiff must have direct or indirect
evidence that a discriminatory factor at least partially motivated an
employer's action. 4 6 Indeed, in a mixed-motive case, "a plaintiff can
succeed on a discrimination claim even if he or she cannot prove that
discrimination was the sole reason the employer took the challenged
employment action." 4 7 However, plaintiffs should pursue single-motive
cases under either the direct or indirect approaches set forth below and only
pursue a mixed-motive case as a last resort. 48 This is because the mixed
motive approach "leads to limited verdicts if employers can show that they
would have taken the same action even if sex were not a factor," 4 9 which is
also known as the "same decision" defense. In other words, "ifthe plaintiff
demonstrates that an impermissible motive existed, the employer can avail
itself of a limited affirmative defense that restricts the available remedies if

41. Linda Stahl & Courtney B. Perez, Gender, Pregnancy and Caregiver Discrimination
Law: You've Come a Long Way Baby!, 69 THE ADVOC. TEX. 57, 57 (2014).
42.

CALVERT, WILLIAMS & PHELAN, supra note 5, at 47.

43.

Id. at 43.

44. JOAN C. WILLIAMS & CYNTHIA THOMAS CALVERT,
FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES DISCRIMINATION 1-1 (2006).
45.

CALVERT, WILLIAMS & PHELAN, supra note 5, at 49.

46.

WILLIAMS & CALVERT, supranote 44, at 1-12.

WORKLIFE LAW'S GUIDE TO

47. Id. (emphasis added).
48. Id. at 1-14 (citing Wagner v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 17 F. App'x. 141 (4th Cir.
2001) (Plaintiffs do not need to decide whether to pursue a mixed motive case; judges make this
determination after evaluating the evidence and instruct the jury accordingly.)).
49. WILLIAMS & CALVERT, supra note 44, at 1-12.
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it shows that it would have taken the same action absent the impermissible
motivating factor."5 o
In a direct-evidence case, a plaintiff has "smoking gun" evidence.5 ' In
other words, the evidence proves intentional discrimination without
ambiguity, inference, or presumption.5 2 Thus, direct evidence involves
admissions, such as telling a woman she cannot be promoted because she
has a baby.53 However, this type of evidence is uncommon, as "most
employment decisions involve an element of discretion," and "[d]efendants
of even minimal sophistication will neither admit discriminatory animus
nor leave a paper trail demonstrating it."54 Finally, in the more common
indirect-evidence case, a plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence-from
which the fact finder can infer intentional discrimination-and proceeds
under the three-step burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green.5 5
Under the first step of the McDonnell Douglas framework, the
plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination by satisfying
four components. The first prima facie component requires proof that the
plaintiff belongs to a protected class, such as "sex." 56 However, "sex" is
often not a meaningful protected class in FRD cases because plaintiffs
typically claim that employers treat women with children differently than
women without children.57 Thus, a permissible protected class in the FRD
context is "sex" plus another characteristic, such as having young children,
under the "sex plus" theory.58 Accordingly, a mother can establish a prima
facie case of discrimination through two different avenues: by showing that
her employer treated her less favorably than a man with children (as a
"sex"-as-a-protected-class case) or a woman without children (as a "sexplus" case).59
The second prima facie component requires proof that the plaintiff
either performed satisfactorily (in a termination case) or met the minimum

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
411 U.S.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 1-13.
Id. at 1-2.
Id.
Id.
Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 1987).
WILLIAMS & CALVERT, supra note 44, at 1-2; see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
792 (1973).
WILLIAMS & CALVERT, supra note 44, at 1-3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1-4.
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qualifications for a job opening (in a failure-to-hire case). 60 Under the third
prima facie component, the plaintiff must prove that he or she suffered a
materially adverse employment action, such as a termination, demotion, or
refusal to hire. 6 1 The fourth and last prima facie component requires the
plaintiff to prove that the adverse employment action occurred under
circumstances that give rise to an inference of discrimination.62 Many
courts have interpreted this component to require plaintiffs to satisfy a rigid
comparator-evidence test: plaintiffs must prove that their employers treated
the plaintiffs differently than similarly situated persons of the opposite
sex.63 For instance, the employer hired or promoted a father but not a
mother, 64 or the employer refused to grant child-bonding leave to a new
father but routinely gave such leave to new mothers.
In the FRD context, this comparator-evidence test poses three
obstacles. 66 First, there is a limited pool of individuals in which to find
comparators, usually because the staff is small or because they are in a sexsegregated occupation.6 7 Second, it is difficult to define a comparator
outside the protected class, especially where the plaintiff has multiple
protected traits, such as sex and status as a caregiver. 68 Third, it is difficult
to determine how similar the plaintiff must be to the comparator; although
the Supreme Court has required nothing more than general similarity, many
courts have imposed narrow requirements. 69 In fact, "employers in FRD
cases have frequently prevailed on summary judgment because the
plaintiffs have been unable to proffer evidence of sufficiently similar
comparators." 70
Fortunately, "not all courts have required this type of comparative
evidence, relying instead on evidence of sex stereotypes."7 ' Stereotyping
cases stem from a decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,7 2 a non-FRD
case. In Price Waterhouse, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
U.S. 228

Id. at 1-5.
Id.
Id. at 1-6.
Bogas & Croson, supra note 5, at 19.
CALVERT, WILLIAMS & PHELAN, supra note 5, at 49.
Id.
Id. at 67.
Id.
Id. at 67-68.
Id. at 68.
Id.
Bogas & Croson, supra note 5, at 19.
WILLIAMS & CALVERT, supra note 44, at 1-31; see Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490
(1989).
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descriptive and prescriptive stereotypes-as discussed in Part I-constitute
sex discrimination.73 The Court held that the plaintiffs evidence of
stereotypical assumptions-statements that the plaintiff should wear
makeup; walk, talk, and dress more femininely; and act less aggressivewas alone sufficient to establish sex discrimination. 74
Similarly, in the FRD context, the Second Circuit in Back v. Hastings
on Hudson Union Free School District found that Elana Back's evidence of
stereotypical assumptions-statements that plaintiff could not be devoted
to her job and be a good mother-was alone sufficient to establish sex
discrimination.7 5 Furthermore, because status as a caregiver is not as
immutable as sex or race, FRD plaintiffs may be able to use one
comparator more successfully: themselves. 76 Indeed, plaintiffs may be able
to point to how their employers treated them before and after they became
caregivers or their caregiver role became known.77
If the plaintiff succeeds in presenting a prima facie case of
discrimination, thus satisfying the first step of the McDonnell Douglas
framework, the second step shifts the burden to the employer to produce a
The
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action.78
employer's offered reason might be, for example, poor work performance,
excessive absenteeism, lack of requisite qualifications, or violation of work
rules. If the employer satisfies this second step, the burden shifts back to
the plaintiff.79
Because employers "can almost always articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason," the final step of the McDonnell Douglas
framework "usually becomes the focal point of the case." 80 Under this
step, the plaintiff must present evidence that rebuts the employer's reason
for its adverse action.81 A plaintiff can accomplish this requirement by
showing that the employer lacks evidence to support its reason, providing
conflicting or inconsistent reasons, or proffering a reason too trivial to have
82
motivated the action.
73.
74.
75.
2004).

See WILLIAMS & CALVERT, supra note 44, at 1-3 Ito -32.
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235, 258.
Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 113, 121 (2d Cir.

76.

CALVERT, WILLIAMS & PHELAN, supra note 5, at 69.

77.
78.
79.

Id.

80.

2 NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, EMPLOYEE AND UNION MEMBER GUIDE TO LABOR

WILLIAMS & CALVERT, supra note 44, at 1-7.
Id.

LAW § 6:59 (2016).
81. WILLIAMS & CALVERT, supra note 44, at 1-8.
82. Id. at 1-9.
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DisparateImpact

In a Title VII action, an employee can bring a disparate impact claim
by proving that his or her employer implemented "practices or policies that
appear to be neutral on their face" but had "a significantly negative impact
on workers of only one sex." 83 One example is a policy that does not
permit any time off work; such a policy disproportionately affects pregnant
women. The disparate impact suit consists of three steps: (1) the plaintiff
must establish a prima facie case that the practice or policy disparately
impacted a protected group, typically relying on statistical evidence; (2) the
employer can avoid liability by showing that the policy was essential to the
business and applied consistently; and (3) the plaintiff must establish less
discriminatory practices to satisfy the employer's business goals. 84
B.

The Fourteenth Amendment (Equal Protection Clause and Due
Process Clause) of the U.S. Constitution via 42 U.S.C. section 1983

State and local government employees can use Section 1983 in FRD
cases to enforce their constitutional rights.85 Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or
the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress .... 86
To succeed under this statute, "the plaintiff must show that he or she
has been injured as a result of 'state action,' which requires that a
defendant act 'under color of State law."' 87 The U.S. Supreme Court "has
construed this to mean the defendant who abused the power he or she
received from a state, 'whether they act in accordance with their authority
or misuse it.

83.
84.

Id. at 106.
WILLIAMS & CALVERT, supra note 44, 1-19 to -20.

85.

CALVERT, WILLIAMS & PHELAN, supra note 5, at 603.

86.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2015).

87.

CALVERT, WILLIAMS & PHELAN, supra note 5, at 603.

88.

Id. (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961)).
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A violation of the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause
can serve as a predicate offense that can be prosecuted via Section 1983. In
other words, employees can use Section 1983 to enforce their rights under
the Equal Protection Clause or the Due Process Clause in court. Indeed,
Section 1983 does not provide any substantive rights but merely provides
the procedure for enforcing constitutional substantive rights, 89 unlike Title
VII, which provides both the procedural and substantive rights. 90
1.

The FourteenthAmendment's Equal Protection Clause

The Equal Protection Clause states that no state shall "deny to any
person ... the equal protection of the laws." 9 1 To pursue a claim under the
Equal Protection Clause via Section 1983, a plaintiff must satisfy two steps.
First, the plaintiff must show intentional or purposeful discrimination to
prove a violation. 92 In order to satisfy this step, a number of courts allow
plaintiffs to apply the same standards developed in Title VII's disparate
treatment litigation.9 3 These standards include the mixed-motive evidence
approach, 94 the direct evidence approach, 95 and the indirect evidence
approach-such as the use of the McDonnell Douglas framework, 96
Furthermore, although
comparators,97 and stereotypical assumptions.9

89. Fox Rothschild LLP, Is Title VII the Exclusive Remedy for Employment Discrimination
Claims?, FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP (Oct. 10, 2012), http://employmentdiscrimination.f
oxrothschild.com/2012/1 0/articles/another-category/title-vii/is-title-vii-the-exclusive-remedy-foremployment-discrimination-claims/.
90. Benjamin Berkman, Eliminating the Distinction Between Sex and Sexual Orientation
Discriminationin Title VII's AntiretaliationProvisions, 2014 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 533, 533 (2014).

&

91. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
92. Gutzwiller v. Fenik, 860 F.2d 1317, 1325 (6th Cir. 1988); CALVERT, WILLIAMS
PHELAN, supra note 5, at 605.
93. Hildebrandt v. Ill. Dep't of Nat. Res., 347 F.3d 1014, 1036 (7th Cir. 2003) ("'[T]he
same standards for proving intentional discrimination apply to Title VII and [Section] 1983 equal
protection' claims.") (quoting Williams v. Seniff, 342 F.3d 774, 788 n.13 (7th Cir. 2003));
Beardsley v. Webb, 30 F.3d 524, 527 (4th Cir. 1994) ("Courts may apply the standards developed
in Title VII litigation to similar litigation under [Section] 1983."); Gutzwiller, 860 F.2d at 1325
("As this court has observed several times, the showing a plaintiff must make to recover on a
disparate treatment claim under Title VII mirrors that which must be made to recover on an equal
protection claim under [S]ection 1983.").
94. Weberg v. Franks, 229 F.3d 514, 522 (6th Cir. 2000); Instructions Regarding Section
1983 Employment Claims, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 7,

www.ca3.uscourts.gov/sites/ca3/files/7_Chap_7_2014_fall.pdf.
95. Weberg, 229 F.3d at 522.
96. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993); Weberg, 229 F.3d at 522;
Robert C. Cadle, Burdens of Proof Presumption and Pretext in Disparate Treatment
Employment DiscriminationCases, 78 MASS. L. REV. 122, 123 (1993).
97. See Bogas & Croson, supra note 5, at 19.
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"courts have not permitted disparate impact claims to be brought under
Section 1983.

. .

. [s]tatistics showing disparate impact may be considered

as evidence of intent." 99 Lastly, whereas a successful "same-decision"
defense will solely reduce a defendant's Title VII liability in a mixed
motive case, it will completely remove a defendant's liability under Section
1983.100
Once the plaintiff establishes intentional discrimination, the second
step under the Equal Protection Clause is to prove which test-strict
scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis review-the court should
use in deciding whether this discrimination violated the Equal Protection
Clause. "Suspect" classifications, such as race or fundamental rights, are
subject to the demanding strict scrutiny test, under which the employer
must prove that the classification is "narrowly tailored and justified by a
compelling state interest." 0 1 On the other hand, classifications based on
sex are typically analyzed under a more forgiving, intermediate scrutiny
test, under which the employer must "prove that the classification is
'substantially related' to an 'important' governmental interest." 02 For all
other classifications, courts utilize a lower level of scrutiny known as
rational basis review, under which the classification must be reasonably
related to a legitimate governmental interest. Under this review, employers
"almost always survive an equal protection challenge."l 0 3 As discussed
below, FRD plaintiffs should press for application of strict scrutiny to
increase their likelihood of success in court.
In the FRD context, once a court finds that an employer's actions
constitute intentional sex discrimination, intermediate scrutiny is triggered,
and the employer "will likely not survive a challenge."' 0 4 For example, in
Knussman v. Maryland, a state trooper successfully relied on Section 1983
to enforce his equal-protection rights against the denial of his nurturing
leave request to care for his newborn child.'0o The court found that
"justifications for gender-based distinctions that are rooted in 'overbroad
generalizations

about

the different . ..

capacities . ..

of males

and

98. Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2004);
Knussman v. Maryland, 272 F.3d 625 (4th Cir. 2001); Bogas & Croson, supranote 5, at 19.
99. CALVERT, WILLIAMS & PHELAN, supra note 5, at 605.
100. InstructionsRegarding Section 1983 Employment Claims, supra note 94, at 8.
101. Williams & Segal, supra note 38, at 152.
102. Id.; accord Constitutional Rights: Equal Protection, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION (Jan. 4, 2017), http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/about/rightsofwomen-chapterl.pdf.
103. Williams & Segal, supra note 38, at 152.
104. Id.
105. Knussman v. Maryland, 272 F.3d 625, 629-30, 635 (4th Cir. 2001).
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females"' do not constitute important governmental objectives.106 Indeed,
"gender classifications that appear to rest on nothing more than
conventional notions about the proper station in society for males and
females have been declared invalid time and again by the Supreme
Court." 0 7 However, although "the intermediate scrutiny test ensures that
the Court will take a more critical look" at sex discrimination than it would
under the lower-level scrutiny, it "provides no guarantee" that sex
discrimination will be penalized, and it "still allows courts latitude in
violates the Equal
deciding whether or not a government action ...
Protection Clause." 08
Consequently, some FRD plaintiffs have advocated for application of
"[N]o
strict scrutiny, equal protection claims for sex discrimination.
majority of the Supreme Court has ever declared sex a suspect
classification, like race, that would automatically require 'strict
scrutiny."' 09 However, as discussed below, a plaintiff in the FRD context
"could argue for a strict level of scrutiny on the basis that having and
caring for children is a fundamental right and interference with that right
deserves the highest level of protection, thereby implicating both the Equal
Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 0
The FourteenthAmendment's Due Process Clause

2.

The Due Process Clause states, "No person shall be ... deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ... ."1 Courts have
interpreted the Due Process Clause to provide employees with both
procedural and substantive protections.1 2 The procedural due process
protection affords employees three types of interests: liberty interest in
reputation,1 13 liberty interest in privacy," 4 and property interest in
employment."' 5 The substantive due-process protection affords employees

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 635.
Id. at 636.
See ConstitutionalRights: Equal Protection, supra note 102, at 7.
Id. (emphasis added).
CALVERT, WILLIAMS & PHELAN, supranote 5, at 608.

111. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
112. Marti Houser, Lisa S. Kohn & George S. Crisci, Individual Rights in Public Sector
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
BAR
ASSOCIATION,
AMERICAN
Employment,
administrative/laborlaw/meetings/2008/ac2008/143.authcheckdam.pdf.
113. Id.
114.

CALVERT, WILLIAMS & PHELAN, supra note 5, at 607.

115.

Houser et al., supra note 112.
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a.
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Each protection

Procedural Due Process: Liberty Interest in Reputation

Although the Court does not consider reputation, by itself, to be a
protected interest, a plaintiff can make a "claim for deprivation of a liberty
interest in reputation" by showing "stigma to his reputation plus
deprivation of some additional right or interest," also known as the
"stigma-plus" test.'17
The "stigma" is the "creation and [public]
dissemination of a false and defamatory impression"" 8 that must imply a
serious character defect, such as immorality or dishonesty, and not simply
poor performance, neglect of duty, incompetence, or malfeasance.1 9 The
"plus" is a significant demotion, which may include reassignment to a
position outside the field of choice or termination.' 20 When an employee
suffers these damages, that employee is entitled to notice and a nameclearing hearing,121 which provides "an opportunity to refute the charge." 2 2
For example, in Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, the Third Circuit
concluded that Hill satisfied the "stigma-plus" test.1 23 The "stigma" was
the mayor's false, public accusations to Hill's colleagues, at council
meetings, and in a newspaper article that Hill engaged in corrupt and
criminal behavior, such as illegally moving funds to confuse people.1 2 4
The "plus" was Hill's constructive discharge, or forced resignation.'25
Although no FRD cases in which a plaintiff relied on the Due Process
Clause to protect a reputation interest have been identified at the time of
this Note, FRD plaintiffs have brought claims alleging violations of state
defamation laws,1 2 6 which have certain elements in common with the

116. Id.
117. Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 236 (3d Cir. 2006).
118. Id.
119. Ridpath v. Bd. of Governors Marshall Univ., 447 F.3d 292, 308 (4th Cir. 2006); Ludwig
v. Bd. of Tr. of Ferris State Univ., 123 F.3d 404, 410 (6th Cir. 1997).
120. Ridpath, 447 F.3d at 309.
121. Houser et al., supra note 112; James F. Allmendinger, Daniel J. Broxup & David R.
Fernstrum, The First, Fourth and Fifth Amendment ConstitutionalRights of Public EmployeesFree Speech, Due Process and Other Issues, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, http://www.amer
icanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/labor law/meetings/2009/ac2009/151.authcheckdam.
pdf.
122. Bd. of Regents of State Coils. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972).
123. Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 239 (3d Cir. 2006).
124. Id. at 231, 236-37.
125. Id. at 238.
126.

CALVERT, WILLIAMS & PHELAN, supranote 5, at 378.
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"stigma-plus" test-namely false, defamatory statements about the plaintiff
to a third party. 12 7 For example, in Brzezinski v. Tri-State Publishers
Printing & Fulfillment, Inc., a "manager sued her employer for
defamation ... after her employer asked her if she was pregnant, fired her
four days later, and then allegedly told people in the industry that she was
terminated for stealing a gas card." 28 The plaintiff in Brzezinski could
conceivably have also brought a claim utilizing the "stigma-plus" test.
Indeed, the "stigma" would be the employer's false, public accusations to
people in the industry that she stole the gas card, and the "plus" would be
her termination.
Procedural Due Process: Liberty Interest in Privacy

b.

The second type of liberty interest, privacy, includes the right "to
control one's procreation and marital status."l 2 9 Accordingly, several
employees in the FRD context have relied on this interest "to challenge
policies aimed at denying employment to, or terminating the employment
of, unwed mothers." 3 0 In Clark v. Hamilton Community Schools, the court
ruled "that summary judgment for defendants was improper if they
considered her status as [an] unwed mother in making their decision not to
Similarly, in Wardlaw v. Austin Independent School
re-hire her."'31
District, the court found that an unwed, pregnant teacher had a liberty
interest to decide whether to marry and whether to have children.' 32
Most importantly, FRD plaintiffs could argue that their right to
privacy grants them a fundamental right to have and care for children, thus
33
implicating strict scrutiny review under the Equal Protection Clause.1
Indeed, the "Supreme Court has relied on both the Equal Protection
doctrine and a right to privacy . .. in developing a line of cases that
establishes a fundamental right to privacy regarding marriage, procreation,
and family."' 34 For instance, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Court held
that a statute mandating students to attend only public schools was
unconstitutional, as it "denied parents [the] right to make decisions
127. Id.
128. Id. at 380; accord Trial Order, Brzezinski v. Tri-State Publishers Printing & Fulfillment,
Inc., N.Y. Slip Op. 32754(U) (2008) (No. 22913/05), 2008 WL 4678385, at *1.
129.

CALVERT, WILLIAMS & PHELAN, supra note 5, at 607.

130. Id.
131. Id. at 607 n.38; accord Clark v. Hamilton Cmty. Schs., No. F84-136, 1985 WL 383, at
*1 (N.D. Ind. Jun. 18 1985).
132. CALVERT, WILLIAMS & PHELAN, supra note 5, at 607 n.37; see Wardlaw v. Austin
Indep. Sch. Dist., No. A-75-CA-17, 1975 WL 182, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 6,1975).
133.

CALVERT, WILLIAMS & PHELAN, supranote 5, at 608.

134.

Id. at 608 n.44.
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regarding their children's education."l35 In Zablocki v. Redhail, the Court
deemed marriage to be a fundamental right, because it is a "foundation 1 of
36
'procreation, childbirth, child rearing, and family relationships."'
Additionally, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court held that a law allowing
"distribution of contraceptives to married couples, but not unmarried
persons, violated [the] Equal Protection Clause and [a] fundamental right of
individual[s] to make [the] most personal decision of 'whether to bear or
beget a child.'"

3

Relying on these cases, the Second Circuit in Back v. Hastings on
Hudson Union Free School District, an FRD case, recognized that
"individuals have a due process right to be free from undue interference
with their procreation, sexuality, and family."' 38 Furthermore, the Second
Circuit implied, without holding, that Elena Back-a public school
psychologist who was denied tenure because she was a mother-could
have argued for a strict level of scrutiny by alleging "that the defendants
violated her constitutional rights to have and care for children."' 3 9
c.

Procedural Due Process: Property Interest

The procedural due process protection also provides certain state and
local employees a property interest in employment, which entitles them to
notice and a hearing before termination; they "cannot be discharged
without first ... being notified of the reasons for the impending discharge
and a meaningful opportunity to respond by explaining the employee's
'side' of the story."l 4 0 Indeed, "[t]he availability of a full hearing after an
employee's discharge (e.g., through a grievance procedure, etc.) does not
relieve the public employer of the duty to provide notice and an
opportunity to be heard before an employee is suspended or discharged."'41
However, not all state and local employees enjoy a property interest in their
42
jobs, as this interest does not derive directly from the U.S. Constitution.'
Instead, this interest derives from state law or other external sources, such

135. Id.; accord Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
136. CALVERT, WILLIAMS & PHELAN, supra note 5, at 608 n.44; accord Zablocki v. Redhail,
434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978).
137.
405 U.S.
138.
2004).
139.
140.
141.
142.

CALVERT, WILLIAMS & PHELAN, supra note 5, at 608 n.44; accord Eisenstadt v. Baird,
438, 453 (1972).
Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 118 n.6 (2d Cir.
Id. at 118.
Allmendinger, Broxup & Fernstrum, supra note 121.
Id.
Houser et al., supra note 112.
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as state academic tenure statutes, employment contracts,143 collective
bargaining agreements, employee handbooks, personnel policies, and
Accordingly, "at-will"
common practices in the workplace. 144
employees-those who are not protected by state law or other external
sources-generally have no constitutionally protected property interest in
employment.
Although the amount of process due to employees with a property
interest in employment varies with the circumstances,1 45 the U.S. Supreme
Court in Gilbert v. Homar recognized three relevant balancing factors in
making this determination: "(1) the private interest that will be affected by
the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the Government's interest."' 4 6
Additionally, in determining the first factor, "account must be taken of the
length and finality of the . . . deprivation."l 4 7
In Gilbert v. Homar, the Court held that the State had provided
Homar, a police officer who was arrested on felony drug charges, sufficient
procedural due process, even after it failed to give him notice or a hearing
before suspending him without pay.1 4 8 Specifically, in relying on the
aforementioned three-factor balancing test, the Court first maintained that
Homar "faced only a temporary suspension without pay" and that "the lost
income is relatively insubstantial (compared with termination)." 4 9 Second,
and the factor most important in Gilbert, the Court held that the arrest and
filing of the charges provided enough assurance that the State had
reasonable grounds to support Homar's suspension.' 50 Third, the Court
determined that the State had a significant interest in suspending Homarto preserve public confidence in the police force.'
On the other hand, in Solomon v. PhiladelphiaHousing Authority, the
Third Circuit considered all three balancing factors to weigh in favor of the
employee.1 52 First, Philadelphia Housing Authority ("PHA") deprived
Solomon, a police officer, of an important private interest-his means of

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.
Allmendinger et al., supra note 121.
Id.
Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 924 (1997).

149.
150.

Id. at 932.
Id. at 933.

151.
152.

Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 932-33 (1997).
Solomon v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 143 F. App'x. 447, 455 (3d Cir. 2005).

Id.
Id.
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livelihood, namely continued pay-while keeping him in limbo about the
extent and other details of his suspension.1 5 3 Second, PHA risked an
erroneous deprivation of Solomon's private interests, because at the time
PHA decided to suspend Solomon, it only knew that Philadelphia law
enforcement planned to arrest Solomon, and it heard conflicting stories
regarding the basis of the arrest. 154 Third, the government's interest in
suspending Solomon was minimal because he had not yet been arrested and
was already on leave and unable to return without PHA's medical
approval.15 5
Although no FRD cases in which a plaintiff relied on a procedural
property interest in employment have been identified at the time of this
Note, FRD plaintiffs could rely on the three-factor test to challenge adverse
actions based on caregiving, such as suspension or termination. Plaintiffs
could conceivably stand to gain the most leverage under the first factor by
arguing that their employers not only deprived them of their means of
livelihood, but also interfered with their fundamental right-guaranteed
under their privacy rights-to have and care for children.' 56
d.

Substantive Due Process

Finally, under the substantive due process protection, if an employee
has a property interest in employment, he or she has a "right to be free from
arbitrary and capricious state action."' 5 7 However, the U.S. Supreme Court
has "expressed what often has been read as a reluctance to recognize" that
right.' 58 In Bishop v. Wood, the Court discouraged allowing "every
discharged employee to assert a constitutional claim merely by alleging
that his former supervisor made a mistake": 159
The federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to
review the multitude of personnel decisions that are made
daily by public agencies. We must accept the harsh fact
that numerous individual mistakes are inevitable in the
day-to-day administration of our affairs. The United States
153. Id. at 454.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 454-55.
156. CALVERT, WILLIAMS & PHELAN, supra note 5, at 608.
157. Houser et al., supra note 112; accord Harvey Brown & Sarah V. Kerrigan, 42 U.S.C. §
1983: The Vehicle for ProtectingPublic Employees' Constitutional Rights, 47 BAYLOR L. REV.
619, 644 (1995).
158. Houser et al., supra note 112, at 13; accord CALVERT, WILLIAMS & PHELAN, supra
note 5, at 604, 607.
159. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 349 (1976).
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Constitution cannot feasibly be construed to require federal
judicial review for every such error. In the absence of any
claim that the public employer was motivated by a desire
to curtail or to penalize the exercise of an employee's
constitutionally protected rights, we must presume that
official action was regular and, if erroneous, can best be
corrected in other ways. The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is not a guarantee against incorrect
or ill-advised personnel decisions.1 6 0
Furthermore, the "parameters of that right have not been developed
clearly,"' 6 ' and the "Supreme Court has not enunciated a standard by which
to determine precisely which state lapses constitute substantive due process
violations under 42 U.S.C. [section] 1983."l62 Yet, several courts have
imposed a high burden of proof on plaintiffs who allege violations of that
right. For example, the D.C. Circuit found that plaintiffs cannot succeed on
substantive due process claims unless they "show that state officials are
guilty of grave unfairness in the discharge of their legal responsibilities.
Only a substantial infringement of state law prompted by personal or group
animus, or a deliberate flouting of the law that trammels significant
personal or property rights, qualifies for relief under [Section] 1983."63 In
fact, "[i]nadvertent errors, honest mistakes, agency confusion, even
negligence in the performance of offical [sic] duties, do not warrant redress
under this statute."' 64 Similarly, the Second and Third Circuits require
plaintiffs alleging a violation of substantive due process rights for arbitrary
and capricious action to prove that the action was so outrageous or
egregious as to shock the conscience.' 65 Thus, it can be relatively difficult
for a plaintiff to bring a claim alleging a violation of substantive due
process.
Fortunately, in FRD scenarios, courts are more willing to extend
substantive due process rights in the context of marriage, family, and
procreation. Indeed, the Court has expressed "its reluctance to expand
substantive due process to matters other than those 'relating to marriage,

160. Id. at 349-50.
161. Houser et al., supra note 112.
162. Silverman v. Barry, 845 F.2d 1072, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
163. Id. at 1080.
164. Id.
165. Kaucher v. Cty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 425 (3d Cir. 2006); O'Connor v. Pierson, 426
F.3d 187, 203 (2d Cir. 2005).
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family, procreation, and the right to bodily integrity."'l 66 For example, in
Cleveland Board ofEducation v. LaFleur, the Court stated:
This Court has long recognized that freedom of personal
choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the
liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.... [T]here is a right 'to be free
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether
to bear or beget a child.' 6 7

'

Based on this reasoning, the Court held that school boards' rules
mandating maternity leave for teachers either four or five months before
childbirth violated the Due Process Clause because they sought to impose
arbitrarily, and without a factual basis, an irrebuttable presumption that
teachers could not teach effectively beyond their fourth or fifth month of
pregnancy.1 6 8 Specifically, the challenged provisions created "a conclusive
presumption that every pregnant teacher who reaches the fifth or sixth
month of pregnancy is physically incapable of continuing. There is no
individualized determination by the teacher's doctor-or the school
board's-as to any particular teacher's ability to continue at her job." 69
Similarly, in Dreissen v. Freborg, the court ruled that teachers' labor
contracts requiring maternity leave at the end of seven months of
pregnancy was arbitrary and violated the Due Process Clause.1 70 The court
reasoned, "the thrust of the developing law is that a pregnant woman has a
paramount right to retain her job while she is able to perform it
competently. Procreation is a fundamental right.... That right should not
be needlessly impinged upon."' 7
e.

Substantive and Procedural Due Process: A Fundamental Right to Care
for Family

Both substantive and procedural due process protections could
arguably extend to FRD scenarios beyond pregnancy. Although most, if
not all, due process claims in the FRD context have relied on U.S. Supreme

166. Brown & Kerrigan, supra note 157, at 646 n.176 (quoting Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S.
266, 272 (1994)).
167. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974) (quoting Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)).
168. LaFleur,414 U.S. at 634-38.
169. Id. at 644.
170. Driessen v. Freborg, 431 F. Supp. 1191, 1196 (D.N.D. 1977).
171. Id. at 1195 (internal citations omitted).

336

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 44:3

Court precedent protecting a pregnant mother's fundamental right to have
children, that right could conceivably extend to protect a right to care for
children, sick spouses, aging parents, or disabled family members. Indeed,
the U.S. Supreme Court "develop[ed] a line of cases that establishes a
and family." 72 In
fundamental right to privacy regarding marriage ...
Zablocki, the Court deemed marriageto be a fundamental right, because it
is a foundation of child rearing and family relationships.173 In Cleveland
Board of Education, the Court recognized the constitutional "freedom of
personal choice in matters of marriage and family hfe."l74 In Albright v.
Oliver, the Court was reluctant to expand substantive due process to
matters other than those relating to marriageand familyi75
To be sure, these cases did not expressly consider a fundamental right
to care for sick spouses, aging parents, or disabled family members.
Instead, these cases were immediately concerned with an individual's
fundamental right to marry and a parent's right to have and care for
children. Nevertheless, the rationale of these cases can be applied to other
scenarios involving the family because of the basic reasons why certain
rights associated with the family have been protected under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause,17 6 which this Note discusses below.
Indeed, in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, the U.S. Supreme
Court relied on cases immediately concerned with a parent's fundamental
right to have and care for children to hold that family members, unlike
unrelated individuals, have a fundamental right to live together in the same
dwelling. 77 Further, the Court did not limit this right to the nuclear
family. 17 8 Thus, the Court held that a neighborhood zoned for singlefamily occupancy, and which defined "family" so as to prevent relativessuch as uncles, aunts, cousins, and grandparents-from living together,
violated the Due Process Clause. 179 The key point for our purposes,
however, is that in order to reach this holding, the Court recognized the
basic reasons why families are afforded protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause: "the Constitution protects the sanctity

172. Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family
Caregiverswho Are DiscriminatedAgainst on the Job, 26 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 77, 152 n.506.
173. Id.; accord Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978).
174. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639 (1974) (emphasis added).
175. Brown & Kerrigan, supra note 157, at 646 n.176 (emphasis added); see also Albright v.
Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271-72 (1994).
176. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 501 (1997).
177.
178.
179.

Id. at 499.
Id. at 504.
Id. at 504-05.
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of the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted
in this Nation's history and tradition. It is through the family that we
inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral and
cultural."iso
Like choices concerning marriage, procreation, and childrearing-all
of which are protected by the Constitution-decisions concerning the care
of sick spouses, aging parents, or disabled family members can be among
the most intimate an individual can make regarding family relationships
and family life. Thus, U.S. Supreme Court precedent protecting an
individual's fundamental right to marry and a parent's fundamental right to
have and care for children could conceivably extend to protect the right to
care for sick spouses, aging parents, or disabled family members. For
example, if an employer terminates an employee for taking time off to care
for her bedridden father without first providing notice and a hearing, then
she could bring a plausible claim against her employer on the grounds that
he violated her Fourteenth Amendment substantive and procedural due
process rights.

III. The Choice Between Title VII and Section 1983: Choosing
Which Claims to Bring
FRD plaintiffs should pursue both Title VII and Section 1983 claims
for two reasons. First, as discussed in Part II, the legal standard that applies
to adjudicating a Title VII claim overlaps with that of the Equal Protection
Clause through Section 1983. Thus, a plaintiff can kill the proverbial two
birds with one stone: the legal standards of Title VII and Section 1983 are
sufficiently connected that a plaintiff who satisfies one statute will also
likely satisfy the other. Second, as discussed below, the remedies provided
by Title VII, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Due Process Clause via
Section 1983 "supplement, rather than . .. supplant" each other.1 "' Thus, a
major benefit of combining Title VII and Section 1983 claims is that "Title
VII overrides absolute immunities enjoyed by states and partial immunities
enjoyed by municipalities[,]" whereas Section 1983 cannot; and "Section
1983 may be used to sue public officials in their personal capacities,"
whereas Title VII cannot.182 However, as discussed below, there is one
caveat-the burden of proof-to cases involving concurrent Title VII and
Section 1983 claims.
180. Id. at 503-04.
181. See Michele W. Homsey, Employment Discriminationin the Public Sector: The Implied
Repeal ofSection 1983 by Title VII, 15 LAB. LAW. 509, 544 (2000).
182.

ARTHUR GUTMAN, LAURA L. KOPPES & STEPHEN J. VODANOVICH, EEO LAW AND

PERSONNEL PRACTICES 12 (Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 3d ed. 1993).
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Courts Allow Plaintiffs to Combine Title VII and Section 1983 Claims

In 1991, Congress amended Title VII to include the major provisions
of jury trials and compensatory and punitive damages so that Title VII's
provisions have a closer resemblance to those of Section 1983,'13 as
In fact, "[t]he only major differences
indicated in Table I below.
remaining" between these statutes concern the number of employees and
the statutes of limitations. 184 This caused courts to question the fairness
and utility of allowing plaintiffs to pursue both causes of action against
their employers.185 Not surprisingly, "defendants began to argue more
forcefully for the implied repeal of [S]ection 1983" as a vehicle to enforce
Fourteenth Amendment rights.1 8 6 Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court,
which has never ruled directly on the question,187 has "strongly indicated,
in dicta, that the legislative intent of Title VII was not to preclude any of
the previously available remedies and thus appeared to allow a plaintiff to
Furthermore, despite Title VII's 1991
utilize either remedy." 88
amendments, nearly all of the U.S. circuit courts have ruled that plaintiffs
can sue under both statutes.1 89 In fact, Congress has the power "to provide

183. Homsey, supra note 181, at 529, 543; Bruce F. Mills, Will 1991 Amendments to Title
VIIAlter Use of Section 1983 Claims to Redress Discriminationin Public Employment?, LABOR
LAW JOURNAL 788, 797, 799 (1998).
184. Mills, supra note 183, at 799.
185. Homsey, supra note 181, at 529.
186. Id. at 539.
187. Id. at 510; Mills, supra note 183, at 791.
188. Mills, supranote 183, at 791-92; accord Homsey, supra note 181, at 511.
189. Ahlmeyer v. Nev. Sys. of Higher Educ., 555 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2009)
(recognizing "the availability of [Section] 1983 claims to Title VII plaintiffs"); Valentine v. City
of Chi., 452 F.3d 670, 685 (7th Cir. 2006) (establishing that a plaintiff may bring both Title VII
and Section 1983 claims for both sexual harassment and discriminatory termination); Birch v.
Cuyahoga Cty. Prob. Court, 392 F.3d 151, 168 (6th Cir. 2004) (acknowledging that an employee
who alleges a violation of Title VII and a separate violation of the Constitution may seek
remedies provided by both Title VII and Section 1983); Johnson v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 148
F.3d 1228, 1230 (11th Cir. 1998) (deeming legislative history of Title VII as reflective of
congressional intent to retain, rather than preempt, Section 1983 as a parallel remedy); Southard
v. Tex. Bd. of Criminal Justice, 114 F.3d 539, 549-50 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting that employees may
assert claims under both Title VII and Section 1983, even when based on the same facts, because
the Constitution provides a right that is independent of Title VII); Beardsley v. Webb, 30 F.3d
524, 527 (4th Cir. 1994) (recognizing that plaintiffs may sue under both Section 1983 and Title
VII because of the need for additional remedies under federal law to deter unlawful workplace
harassment and intentional discrimination); Gierlinger v. N.Y. State Police, 15 F.3d 32, 34 (2d
Cir. 1994) (concluding that a plaintiff may bring both Section 1983 and Title VII claims for
sexual harassment and sex discrimination); Notari v. Denver Water Dep't, 971 F.2d 585, 587
(10th Cir. 1992) (acknowledging "the general rule that a state employee suffering from
discrimination may assert claims under both Section 1983 and Title Vll"); Bair v. City of Atlantic
City, 100 F. Supp. 2d 262, 266 (D.N.J. 2000) ("The vast majority of courts, including the Third
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overlapping and duplicative remedial schemes,"l 90 and courts have held
that Section 1983 should be accompanied by Title VII "to deter unlawful
harassment and intentional discrimination in the workplace."'91
B.

Plaintiffs Should Combine Title VII and Section 1983 Claims

As indicated in Table I, using Section 1983 has some specific
advantages over Title VII: It provides stronger remedies, there is individual
liability, the statute of limitations period is longer, and there is no
administrative prerequisite to file a charge with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission.' 92 To illustrate an example regarding Section
1983's statute of limitations, "in Jones v. Clinton, Paula Jones was beyond
the statute of limitations for Title VII, and was fortunate that the applicable
statute of limitations in Arkansas was sufficiently lengthy for her to make a
timely Section 1983 personal capacity claim against Clinton."l 93 However,
because Section 1983 also has some distinct disadvantages-such as
overcoming a state's absolute immunity and a municipality's partial
immunity-a plaintiff should combine Title VII and Section 1983 claims.
Table I

Protected
Categories'

94

Number of

Circuit, hold that ...
both.").
190.

Equal Protection and
Due Process via
Section 1983

Title VII

Race, national origin,
religion, age, sex,
marital status, samesex domestic partners,
etc.

Limited to race, national
origin, religion, age, and
sex

No requirement for

At least fifteen employees

a plaintiff may bring either a Title VII claim or a Section 1983 claim, or

1 JOHN F. BUCKLEY IV & MICHAEL R. LINDSAY, DEFENSE OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT

CLAIMS § 4:25 (2016).
191. Beardsley, 30 F.3d at 527; accord Johnson, 148 F.3d at 1231.
192. Paul Mollica, Raspardo v. Carlone, No. 12-1686 (2d Cir. Oct. 6, 2014), EMPLOYMENT
LAW BLOG (Oct. 6, 2014), http://www.employmentlawblog.info/2014/10/raspardo-v-carlone-no12-1686-2d-cir-oct-6-2014.shtml.
193. GUTMAN, KOPPES & VODANOVICH, supra note 182, at 181; accord Jones v. Clinton,
990 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. Ark. 1998).
194. Williams & Segal, supra note 38, at 153.
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Employeesl

95

Remedies.

number of employees
Against a state: only
injunctive relief (i.e.,
halting an illegal
practice), no
compensatory
damages, and no
punitive damages 1 96

Against a municipality:
no cap on
compensatory
damages, but no
punitive damagesl 9 7
Against a public
official in his or her
personalcapacity: no
cap on compensatory
and no cap on punitive
damagesl 9 8
May sometimes include
back pay, front pay,
mental anguish, and
attorneys' fees' 99

[Vol. 44:3
rvol. 44:3

Against a private employer:
caps on compensatory and
punitive damages (depends
on number of employees)2 00
15-100 = $50,000
101-200 = $100,000
201-500 = $200,000
501+ = $300,000
Against a public employer:
same caps on compensatory
damages, and no punitive
damages 201
May sometimes include
back pay, front pay, mental
anguish, and attorneys'
feeS 20 2

Statute of
LimitationS203

Often two or three
years

Often 180 days

Jury Trial 204

Right to jury trial

Right to jury trial

195.

Mills, supra note 183, at 797.
196. GUTMAN, KOPPES & VODANOVICH, supra note 182, at 182.
197. Id. at 184; CALVERT, WILLIAMS & PHELAN, supranote 5, at 604.
198. CALVERT, WILLIAMS & PHELAN, supra note 5, at 604.
199. Brown & Kerrigan, supra note 157, at 679.
200. William J. Martinez & Kathleen M. Flynn, Damage Caps Under the Civil Rights Act of
1991, 27-MAR COLO. LAW 65, 65 (1998).
201.
202.
2015).
203.
204.

Id.
See JACOB A. STEIN, 1 STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES TREATISE
Mills, supra note 183, at 799.
Id. at 797.

§ 5:4

(3d ed.
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Plaintiff may proceed
directly to court

Before initiating suit,
claimant must follow
federal administrative
processes

In an equal protection
claim, plaintiff must
show disparate
treatment; proof of
disparate impact may
be evidence of
intentional
discrimination, but not
an independent claim

Plaintiff may show either
disparate treatment or
disparate impact

205

Burden of
Proof2 06

1.
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Title VII Can Overridea State's Absolute Immunity, Whereas Section
1983 Cannot

The Eleventh Amendment grants states sovereign immunity, and
"[a]lthough Part 5 of the 14th [A]mendment permits Congress to abrogate
this immunity ... Congress did not do so in codifying Section 1983 itself.
Thus, states may invoke 11th [A]mendment sovereign state immunity in
any Section 1983 claim." 207
Because of states' absolute immunity, states are not responsible for
any of their public officials' illegal acts.208 As a result, plaintiffs cannot
recover retrospective remedies, such as compensatory damages, against
state entities. The only legal remedy against a state is prospective relief,
that is, an injunction (i.e., halting an illegal practice). 20 9 For example, in
Will v. Michigan, the plaintiff brought a Section 1983 suit for money
damages against Michigan's Department of State Police and its Director of
State Police in his official capacity; the plaintiff lost on both claims. 2 10 As
discussed below, the plaintiff s mistake was not suing the Director of State
Police in his personal capacity. 2 11

205.

CALVERT, WILLIAMS & PHELAN, supra note 5, at 604.

206.

Williams & Segal, supra note 38, at 154.

207.

GUTMAN, KOPPES & VODANOVICH, supranote 182, at 182.

208.
209.
210.

Id.
Id. at 182-83.
Id.; Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 89-90 (1989).

211.

GUTMAN, KOPPES & VODANOVICH, supra note 182, at 182.
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A major benefit of combining Title VII and Section 1983 claims is
that retrospective remedies, such as compensatory damages, are available
in Title VII claims against a state.2 12 For example, in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,
the plaintiff brought a discrimination suit under Title VII against the state
of Connecticut.213 The U.S. Supreme Court upheld money damages against
the State "on the grounds that Congress exercised legitimate authority
under Part 5 of the 14th [A]mendment in overriding 11th [A]mendment
immunity when it extended Title VII coverage to states."214
2.

Title VII Can Override a Municipality'sPartialImmunity, Whereas
Section 1983 Cannot

There are three important aspects regarding municipal liability in
Section 1983 claims. First, municipalities are liable for compensatory
damages under Section 1983 but only "when there is a causal connection
between a constitutionally illegal act and policy statements, ordinances,
regulations, and 'government customs."' 215 For example, in Monell v. New
York City, a Section 1983 case, "two city agencies illegally forced early
maternity leave on pregnant women." 2 16 Because "there was an obvious
causal connection to an illegal public policy (forced maternity leave)," the
City was liable for compensatory damages.2 17
Second, municipalities are vicariously, or strictly, liable "for illegal
For
nondiscretionary acts committed by policy-making officials." 218
example, in City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, where seven policy-making
officials illegally canceled a rock concert, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
the City was liable for compensatory damages under Section 1983.219
Last, because "municipalities do not have vicarious liability for the
illegal acts of non-policy-making public officials,"22 0 a benefit of
combining Title VII and Section 1983 claims is that Title VII can override
For example, in
this partial immunity enjoyed by municipalities.22
Carrero v. New York City, Maria Carrero sued an officer of the New York

212. Id. at 183.
213. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 447-48 (1976).
214. GUTMAN, KOPPES & VODANOVICH, supra note 182, at 183; accord Fitzpatrick, 427
U.S. at 448.
215.

GUTMAN, KOPPES & VODANOVICH, supra note 182, at 184.

216.

Id.; accord Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. ofN.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 661-62 (1978).

217.

GUTMAN, KOPPES & VODANOVICH, supra note 182, at 184.

218.
219.
220.
221.

Id.
City ofNewport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 247 (1981).
GUTMAN, KOPPES & VODANOVICH, supra note 182, at 184.
Id. at 12.
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City Housing Authority for sexual harassment under Title VII and Section
1983.222 Because the officer was not a policy-maker, Carrero won under
Title VII but lost under Section 1983.223
3.

Section 1983 Can Be Used to Sue Public Officials in Their Personal
Capacities, Whereas Title VII Cannot

Another major benefit of combining Title VII and Section 1983 claims
is that "[u]nlike Title VII, Section 1983 may be used to sue public
officials" for their "illegal nondiscretionary acts in their personal
capacities."2 24 For instance, "judges are not liable for bad rulings (e.g.,
early release of a prisoner who then commits murder), but are liable for
discriminatory treatment of court employees." 225
To illustrate the benefit of combining Title VII and Section 1983, in
Torres-Santiago v. Alcaraz-Emmanuelli,226 Adaline Torres-Santiago used
Section 1983 and Title VII to sue Gabriel Alcaraz-Emmanuelli in his
personal capacity as Secretary of Puerto Rico's Department of
Transportation and Public Works by alleging three incidents in which
Alcaraz-Emmanuelli made sexually discriminatory or inappropriate
remarks to her.227 The court dismissed the Title VII claim "because Title
VII does not provide for personal liability," and upheld the Section 1983
claim.2 28

C. The Caveat to Combining Title VII and Section 1983 Claims
One potential caveat awaits plaintiffs who combine Title VII and
Section 1983 claims. Although plaintiffs can and should pursue Title VII
and Section 1983 claims concurrently when they are available, plaintiffs
must of course prove that their employer violated both Title VII and the
Fourteenth Amendment (Equal Protection Clause or Due Process Clause):
Although Title VII supplements and overlaps [Section]
1983, it remains an exclusive remedy when a state or local
employer violates only Title VII.
When, however,
unlawful employment practices encroach, not only on
rights created by Title VII, but also on rights that are
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Carrero v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 668 F.Supp. 196, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
See GUTMAN, KOPPES & VODANOVICH, supra note 182, at 184.
Id. at 12, 180.
Id. at 180.
Torres-Santiago v. Alcaraz-Emmanuelli, 553 F. Supp. 2d 75 (D.P.R. 2008).
Id. at 78, 83-85.
Id. at 83-85.
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independent of Title VII, Title VII ceases to be exclusive.
At this point, [Section] 1983 and Title VII overlap,
providing supplemental remedies.229
For example, a plaintiff who successfully brings a disparate impact
claim under Title VII cannot bypass Section 1983's required proof of
disparate treatment in order to obtain remedies under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Accordingly, plaintiffs "who wish to enforce Title VIIcreated rights should be relegated to Title VII's remedies and procedures,
whereas those who assert distinct constitutional claims should remain free
to do so outside of Title VII's administrative framework." 2 30
IV. Conclusion: Maximizing the Use of Section 1983 in Litigating
FRD Claims
The optimal Section 1983 claim is arguably one that implicates Title
VII, the Equal Protection Clause, and the procedural and substantive
protections under the Due Process Clause. The overlapping legal standards
and remedies under Title VII and Section 1983 indicate that an FRD
plaintiff should pursue both claims when they are available.
Under Title VII's McDonnell Douglas framework, an FRD plaintiff
can rely on the stereotype method-rather than, or in addition to, the more
rigorous comparator method-to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination.
An FRD plaintiff can use this same framework to satisfy the first step
of the Equal Protection Clause via Section 1983. Under the second step,
plaintiffs should argue for strict scrutiny review. Classifications based on
sex are typically analyzed under the intermediate scrutiny test, and suspect
classifications-such as race, or a fundamental right-are subject to the
strict scrutiny test. FRD plaintiffs can argue that interference with family
caregiving responsibilities are subject to strict scrutiny because the right to
care for children, sick spouses, aging parents, or disabled family members
is conceivably a fundamental right. Indeed, U.S. Supreme Court decisions
have established a fundamental right to privacy regarding marriage and
family, deemed marriage to be a fundamental right because it is a
foundation of child rearing and family relationships, recognized the
constitutional freedom of personal choice in matters of marriageandfamily

229. Johnston v. Harris Cty. Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565, 1576 (5th Cir. 1989)
(emphasis added).
230. Homsey, supra note 181, at 546.
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life, and expressed its reluctance to expand substantive due process to
matters other than those relating to marriageandfamily.
With regard to the Due Process Clause via Section 1983, no FRD
cases in which a plaintiff relied on a procedural liberty interest in
reputation have been identified. However, FRD plaintiffs have brought
claims alleging violations of state defamation laws, which could arguably
be used to satisfy the "stigma-plus" test.
FRD plaintiffs have also brought claims in which they relied on their
procedural due process liberty interests in privacy to control their
"procreation and marital status" in order to challenge policies aimed at
denying or terminating the employment of unwed mothers. This privacy
interest could arguably be extended to grant employees a fundamental right
to participate in family caregiving responsibilities.
Furthermore, although employees with a property interest in
employment are entitled to notice and a hearing before termination, no
FRD cases in which a plaintiff relied on this interest have been identified.
However, FRD plaintiffs can rely on this interest and conceivably stand to
gain the most leverage by arguing that their employers not only deprived
them of their means of livelihood but also interfered with their fundamental
right-guaranteed under their privacy rights-to participate in family
caregiving responsibilities.
Lastly, under the substantive due process protection, employees with
property interests in employment have a right to be free from arbitrary and
capricious state action. Under this protection, a group of pregnant teachers
brought claims to fight mandatory maternity leave rules that violated that
right. This protection could conceivably extend to FRD scenarios beyond
pregnancy by arguing that employees have a fundamental right to
participate in family caregiving responsibilities that should be free from
arbitrary and capricious state action.
No discussion of maximizing the use of Section 1983 in FRD claims
would be complete without addressing the importance of treating FRD as a
separate employment law claim in arguing for a strict level of scrutiny.
Viewing and addressing FRD claims as a subset of employment claims
allows practitioners, juries, and judges to see the factual relatedness of FRD
claims-that is, they almost always stem from discrimination based on
unexamined stereotypes about family caregiving responsibilities, 2 3 1 a type
of responsibility that arguably deserves the utmost protection as a
fundamental right.

231.

See CALVERT, WILLIAMS & PHELAN, supra note 5, at 11.
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